Western New England Law Review
Volume 9 9 (1987)
Issue 1

Article 14

1-1-1987

EPILOGUE: PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
ENCOUNTERS "ON A DARKLING PLAIN"
Jay Katz

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Jay Katz, EPILOGUE: PHYSICIAN-PATIENT ENCOUNTERS "ON A DARKLING PLAIN", 9 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 207 (1987),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

PHYSICIAN-PATIENT ENCOUNTERS "ON A
DARKLING PLAIN"
JAY KATZ·

The pUblication of this volume fulfills one of my fondest expecta
tions. As I wrote in the introduction to The Silent World of Doctor
and Patient; 1
[the] ultimate purpose [of my book] is to initiate a more enlightened
debate about the respective rights, duties, and needs of physicians
and patients in their intimate, anxiety-producing, and fateful en
counters with one another. . .. The problems of ... greater patient
participation in the medical decision-making process ... deserve
study and their in-depth analysis must be extended beyond where I
leave off. . .. [M]any additional leads need to be pursued. In this
book I have been unable to explore any to their depth. Instead, I
have tried to identify as many issues as possible and to pursue them
for some distance (pp. xiii, xix, xx).

The editors of the Western New England Law Review responded to
my hopes and I am grateful to them for the loving care with which
they executed this project.
The largely unexplored and controversial issues that I identify in
my book have been neglected for too long. Among these issues, one is
most basic: my assertions that the responsible practice of medicine
demands caring attention not only to patients' physical needs but also
to patients' needs to decide how these physical needs are to be
satisfied.
The advances in medical science have markedly improved the
benefits that patients can derive from diagnostic and therapeutic inter
ventions unheard of only a few decades ago, but these very same ad
vances not only increase opportunities for choice among treatment
alternatives but also expose patients to different, and at times consider
able, known and unknown risks. Yet, the availability of choice and
the danger of inflicting pain and suffering have not moved physicians
* John A. Garver Professor of Law and Psychoanalysis, Yale Law School; B.A.,
University of Vermont, 1944; M.D., Harvard Medical School, 1949.
1. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter
Katz].
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to consider seriously the question: When must choice be delegated to
patients? Instead, physicians still maintain that decisionmaking is
their prerogative. However, what was true for the dark ages of
medicine, when doctors had little more to offer than caring comfort, is
not true for the age of medical science, when doctors' ministrations
can both ameliorate and increase suffering.
In these concluding remarks I shall comment on only a few of the
symposium's articles in an attempt to pursue further the new leads
opened up by their thoughtful critique of my work. I am grateful to
these contributors, as well as to the other authors whom I do not men
tion, for their generous reading of my work. All took seriously my
admonition that, if what I have done has merit, it must be extended
beyond where I left off.
My book, now three years old, has been cited in many articles and
books. Their authors have come almost exclusively from the ranks of
non-physicians. I mention this fact to address first one criticism of my
work: that my emphasis on physicians' obligations to ensure fidelity
to joint decisionmaking was a mistake. 2 Instead, I should have written
a book for patients, if only because doctors would not readily change
deeply ingrained convictions without outside pressure.
My critics felt that the focus on physicians' responsibilities not
only "[betrays] vestiges of paternalism"3 but also "subtly reinforces
the very dependency of the patient [on the physician]."4 These con
cerns have merit. I should have addressed more explicitly what pa
tients can and must do in order to facilitate giving their voices a more
respectful hearing in medical decisionmaking. Indeed, I should have
said more about patients' responsibility to change existing practices
because I already believed then, as I feel even more strongly now, that
the medical profession will not readily change habits of silence unless
forced to do so by citizen-patients.
However, many reasons-some more important than others-led
me to proceed as I did. First and foremost, I wanted to demonstrate
that the idea of informed consent, 5 i. e., that patients share the burdens
2. See Baron, On Knowing One's Chains and Decking Them with Flowers: Limits on
Patient Autonomy in "The Silent World of Doctor and Patient," 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
31, 40 n.8 (1987); Caplan, Can We Talk? A Review of Jay Katz, "The Silent World of
Doctor and Patient," 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 43, 50 (1987).
3. Baron, supra note 2, at 40 n.8.
4. Id.; Caplan, supra note 2, at 50.
5. "[O]ne must draw sharp distinctions between the legal doctrine [of informed con
sent], as promulgated by judges, and the idea of informed consent, based on a commitment
to individual self-determination." KATZ, supra note I, at xvi.
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of decision with their doctors, is, to begin with, not a patient problem
but a physician problem. For a considered judgment on patients' ca
pacity for decisionmaking can be rendered only once it is determined
that physicians have the capacity for conversing with patients about the
medical decisions that need to be made. These are problems not only
regarding physicians' willingness to learn an unaccustomed new lan
guage, and then to talk with patients, but also regarding physicians'
willingness to confront and come to terms with medical uncertainty
(pp. 165-206).
The more I reflect about doctor-patient communication, the more
convinced I become that in this modem age of medical science which
for the first time permits sharing with patients the uncertainties of di
agnosis, treatment, and prognosis, the problem of uncertainty poses
the most formidable obstacle to disclosure and consent. For sharing
uncertainties requires a willingness to admit ignorance about benefits
and risks; to profess to the existence of alternatives, each with its own
known and unknown consequences; to eschew one single authoritative
recommendation; to consider carefully how to present uncertainties so
that patients will not become overwhelmed by the information they
are required to know; and to explore the crucial question of how much
uncertainty physicians themselves can tolerate without compromising
their effectiveness as healers.
Physicians' unexamined conviction that patients, by virtue of
their anxieties over being ill and medicine's esoteric knowledge, are
incapable of participating in sharing the burdens of decision with their
doctors, has made confrontation with uncertainty, at least to the ex
tent of making patients aware of its ubiquitous presence, unnecessary.
Thus, the at best groping, half-hearted, thoughtless and misleading at
tempts to inform patients about uncertainty have made doctors' com
munications confusing and incomprehensible. No wonder that
patients appear stupid and ignorant; no wonder that patients say with
resignation: "You are the doctor, you decide."
Second, I also wanted to demonstrate that physicians' unques
tioned convictions that non-disclosure serves patients' interests best
make it impossible to distinguish between those patients who wish and
those who do not wish to be taken into doctors' confidence. It may
tum out, once patients are provided with the opportunity of sharing
the burdens of decision, that many will decline; but certainly not all
will. The latter need to be identified so that their voices can be ac
corded the respect they deserve.
The arguments that patients long ago would have insisted on ex
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ercising their right to participate in decisionmaking had they wished to
do so, or that their not doing so is evidence of a felt need, when sick
and anxious, to place themselves trustingly into physicians' care, I find
unpersuasive. These arguments prove too much.
Patients, when sick, are indeed scared, particularly since illness
tends to bring to the surface fears of death and concerns over mortal
ity that otherwise are repressed. These fears and concerns are mobil
ized even though the particular illness may not be life-threatening.
They are also wittingly and unwittingly exploited by physicians in or
der to ensure compliance. 6 Death's hovering presence as a third party
to physician-patient encounters invites surrender lest, if one offends
physicians by imposing on their time or questioning their recommen
dations, they will be less willing to stand by in the hour of ultimate
need and gently ferry patients across the river Styx to their final rest
ing place.
However unjustified such fears may be, they are real fears; fears
that are reinforced by physicians' all too common silent, and not so
silent, resort to threats of abandonment: "If you are unwilling to ac
cept my recommendation, why don't you seek out another physician?"
In this climate joint decisionmaking becomes virtually impossible.
Physicians must learn to put their patients at ease about the remote
ness of death or the unlikelihood of serious consequences to their well
being when such outcomes are not in issue, and about their fears of
abandonment, when they question their physicians too closely.
It remains equally unclear to what extent "[p]aternalism exists in
medicine ... to fulfill a need created by illness"7 and to what extent it
fulfills a need created by physicians. In not dispelling patients' imagi
nary fears, in keeping patients in the dark about their medical condi
tion, and in treating patients in many other ways as children and not
as adults, doctors wittingly and unwittingly reinforce the regressive
In The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, I state:
The silence that surrounds death, however, does not only reside in the dis
comfort that the topic engenders. Physicians' silence also serves the purpose of
reinforcing their authority over patients. Doctors have an intriguing love-hate
relationship with death: It is both their ally and their enemy. In trying to defeat
death, physicians are death's adversaries. When physicians borrow the power
engendered by patients' fear of death for purposes of control, death is their ally.
Doctors often wittingly and unwittingly exploit the anxieties and fears that even
benign illness engenders in patients by conveying, if not with words then by de
meanor, that not following their orders will accelerate death.
KATZ, supra note 1, at 213-14.
7. Duffy, Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
21, 27 (\987).
6.
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pull engendered by illness. Thus, the contributions which illness or
physicians make to "the need for paternalism" remain unknown. In
turn, we do not know whether physician-patient interactions that rec
ognize patients as the adults they are will not reverse the regressive
pull that illness also mobilizes.
Third, I also wanted to demonstrate that meaningful conversation
between doctors and patients requires physicians to re-examine the an
cient notion that they and their patients have an identity of interests in
medical matters and that, therefore, physicians can make decisions for
patients. Of course, both seek restoration of health and cure and
whenever such ends are readily attainable by only one route, their in
terests indeed do coincide. However, in many physician-patient en
counters, cure has many faces and the means selected affect the nature
of cure in decisive ways.8
Consider, for example, a patient with a fibroid uterus who
presents herself with a complaint of intermittent, increased bleeding
during menses. Cure can mean a hysterectomy, or reassurance that no
dire result will follow from living with the condition, or the employ
ment of various medical means to bring the bleeding at least under
partial control. If the last course of treatment is adopted, some of the
medical interventions could expose the patient to future, as yet un
known, risks. Beyond that problem, doctors and patients may differ
about the value they ascribe to retaining or parting with an organ that
has myriads of symbolic meanings. Clinical examples of the multiplic
ity of ends attainable and means available for the treatment of medical
conditions are numerous, a result of the spectacular advances in medi
cal science. Thus, the question: what constitutes cure? Identity of
interest about ends and means cannot be assumed. It can be estab
lished only through respectful conversation.
The fear that respecting patients' choices may jeopardize a good
medical outcome also requires careful reflection. As I have suggested
already, what constitutes a good medical outcome is not as readily
apparent as is often assumed. 9 Not only can physicians and patients
differ on this question but physicians themselves come to this question
with differing convictions. Again, is removal or retention of a uterus
8. For a perceptive discussion of ends and means in lawyer-client relationships, see
Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on Corporate Lawyering and the
Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 w. NEW ENG. L. REV. 139, 145-46, 148 (1987).
9. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 30: "A poor medical outcome should not be allowed to
evolve due to respect for autonomy." But what is a good medical outcome? When does
"the doctor ... [know what is] best ... [and when is it] arrogance if he or she adheres to
that adage and acts in a patient's behalf ...?" Id. at 24.
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for fibroids the "good" medical decision? Is treatment or non-treat
ment of essential hypertension of moderate degree a "good" medical
decision?
My emphasis on patient autonomy and choice does not under
mine physicians' "moral authority."10 Physicians' authority resides in
their capacity to heal, not in making decisions for others. While phy
sicians may have needed to usurp decisionmaking authority during the
dark ages of medicine, the exercise of such authority has no place in
the age of medical science.
Of course, medical practice has "underpinnings of certainty"ll
the result of the great scientific advances during the last one hundred
years-but science also has made physicians aware of the uncertainties
and ignorance that stalk medical practice. 12 Science also has given
physicians the capacity to distinguish better between certainty and un
certainty. Moreover, physicians embrace science's abiding commit
ment to the search for truth which raises the question: why should not
this commitment to truth extend to conversations with patients?
The moral authority of physicians to make decisions on behalf of
patients requires a more precise and restrictive definition. In physi
cian-patient interactions there probably is room for some discretion in
what to tell and not to tell patients or in making decisions for patients,
10. But see Duffy, supra note 7, at 25: Katz's "perception represents a loss of honor
for a profession which once was thought to possess moral authority and discretion."
II. Id. at 24. But see infra note 12.
12. For example, Lewis Thomas, a physician deeply committed to the practice of
scientific medicine, noted:
The only solid piece of scientific truth about which I feel totally confident is that
we are profoundly ignorant about nature. Indeed, I regard this as the major dis
covery of the past hundred years of biology. . .. It is this sudden confrontation
with the depth and scope of ignorance that represents the most significant contri
bution of twentieth-century science to the human intellect. We are, at last, facing
up to it. In earlier times, we either pretended to understand how things worked or
ignored the problem or simply made up stories to fill the gaps.
L. THOMAS, THE MEDUSA AND THE SNAIL: MORE NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 73
74 (1979).
In a New York Times article, Thomas stated:
The scientific method is guesswork, the making up of stories. The difference
between this and other imaginative works of the human mind is that science is
then obliged to find out whether the guesses are correct, the stories true. Curios
ity drives the enterprise, and the open acknowledgment of ignorance. [W]e know
very little about nature and we understand even less.
Starting with ourselves, and the life immediately around us, we have lots of home
work to do, lots of pride to swallow, lots more ignorance to face, some of it only
sensed out of the comer of the eye ....
Thomas, How Should Humans Pay Their Way? N. Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1981, at A15, cols.
2-5.
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but this discretion must be defined and circumscribed more clearly lest
it will continue to be abused.
Why should this moral authority give physicians the right to
make choices for patients? Does not this moral authority belong to
patients, particularly when choices are available, when each choice is
influenced by medical and other value judgments, when the risk-bene
fit ratio is unclear, and when uncertainty rules medical practice? It is
hubris to answer this question by supporting medical authority merely
on an assertion of beneficence and altruism. 13 It is equally dangerous
to usurp this authority on the ground that patients' "best interests"
demand that doctors assume this responsibility. The history of man
kind gives telling evidence of the harm done in the name of "best
interest." The "protection" in the name of "best interest," extended to
slaves, women, the mentally ill, and juvenile delinquents are examples
in point.
However, there is more; for behind physicians' fears of compro
mising a good medical outcome by acknowledging uncertainty and re
specting patient self-determination, lie even greater fears: that patients
will halt therapy prematurely and will choose instead "an unneces
sary, albeit autonomous, ... [bad outcome or even] death."14
We do not know whether patients will so choose. Such instances
need to be collected and analyzed in depth, in the same way that phy
sicians do in situations when patients, while under the care of their
physicians, inexplicably suffer from major physical morbidities or un
expectedly die.
In instances of patients' opting for an unnecessary bad outcome
or death, we must find out what, if anything, went wrong. Were such
decisions the result of a patient's preference that the particular attend
ing physician or the entire medical community thought to be a wrong
choice? Were such decisions due to misunderstandings about what
was at stake that had not been clarified during conversations between
doctors and patient? Or were such decisions the result of different
13. In the Silent World of Doctor and Patient, I explain:
Altruism, to the extent it exists, can only promise that doctors will try to place
their patients' medical needs over their own personal needs. Even such a promise
is extraordinarily difficult to fulfill in today's medical world which places such
high value on economic rewards. Yet, even in the absence of any self-serving
motivations altruism cannot promise that, without conversation, physicians will
know what patients' needs are or that, without conversation, patients will know
in what differing ways doctors can meet their needs.
KATZ, supra note 1, at 95.
14. Duffy, supra note 7, at 26.
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value preferences about longevity in the face of chronic illness or dif
ferent trade oirs between prolongation and quality of life?
Physicians' concerns that patients may opt for a bad outcome or
death also overlook that the wish to live as long and as free from suf
fering as possible is a compelling motivation for all human beings.
While persons may engage in all kinds of ill-considered and hazardous
conduct-smoking, mountain climbing-that can foreshorten life,
once confronted with the choice of death or a medical intervention
that will preserve life and well-being, they will, absent a severe mental
disorder, choose the former except for the most compelling reasons. I
doubt that physicians often will be faced with such stand oirs if they
learn to communicate better with their patients, take the time to dispel
misunderstandings, and appreciate, in cases of disagreement, that con
siderable merit may reside in their patients' choice. The desire to live
is very powerful, and patients will not lightly opt for death.
All that I have said so far seeks to lend additional sUpport 15 to my
contention that "physicians must take the initiative and lead the way"
(p. 229) in implementing the idea of mutual decisionmaking. When
needy patients appear before them, physicians, by virtue of their
knowledge and power, can manipulate disclosures and exploit needi
ness if they wish to do S016 and thus make a mockery of joint
decisionmaking.
As I have suggested already, only if doctors become committed to
sharing the burdens of decision can it be ascertained whether patients
have the capacity for choice. My emphasis on physicians' responsibil
ity to take the "initiative," however, could have been misunderstood.
15. These issues I discuss at length throughout The Silent World of Doctor and Pa
tient. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 1, Chapter IV "Sharing Authority: The Willingness to
Trust," at 85-103; Chapter VI "Respecting Autonomy: The Obligation for Conversation,"
at 130-64; Chapter VII "Acknowledging Uncertainty: The Confrontation of Knowledge
and Ignorance," at 165-206.
16. Specifically, in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, I note:
[W]hat passes today for disclosure and consent in physician-patient interactions is
largely an unwitting attempt by physicians to shape the disclosure process so that
patients will comply with their recommendations. In a recent discussion on in
formed consent, a group of senior surgeons seemed genuinely puzzled by the
"quaint" informed consent rule, particularly since they were certain that they
could always guide patients to accept the treatment they had selected for them.
"Why," they asked, "should we be forced to go through a ritual that ultimately
accomplishes so little?" I responded by asking them how they would react if law
at some time in the future attempted through informed consent to make patients
co-decision makers? They thought that such an objective would be totally unreal
istic, if not dangerous. "Patients," they asserted, "do not have the capacity to
make medical decisions."
KATZ, supra note 1, at 26-27.
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I was not trying to suggest that doctors now should, take charge of
decisionmaking and impose it on patients. I only wished to under
score that patients' willingness to make decisions and capacity to do so
can be ascertained only once physicians are willing "to facilitate pa
tients' opportunities for reflection" (p. 122) about the choices available
to them. I repeatedly stated in my book that while
the posited obligation to converse introduces an element of pater
nalism into my prescription, [it must also be recognized that] the
obligations I advocate are imposed on both parties; they do not ask
for one party to submit to the other; they are grounded in mutual
ity; and they are dictated by a respect for human psychological
functioning in the specific context of physician-patient decisionmak
ing ... (p. 128).

In today's world, it is virtually impossible for patients to have a
meaningful input on choice. The withholding and manipulation of in
formation to ensure compliance with doctors' recommendations are
too ubiquitous. If viewed from the perspective of disclosure and con
sent, such practices unite the medical profession in a conspiracy to
exclude patients from decisionmaking. Physicians engage in this con
spiracy not for nefarious reasons but out of abiding, although unexam
ined, convictions that unquestioned trust, obedience, and compliance
are essential ingredients for good patient care.J7 Patients find such
convictions hard to challenge, particularly in solitary encounters with
their doctors when physicians are also perceived as wishing to do good
and as resenting any challenge to their goodness, even though good
intentions are not what patients seek to question.
Moreover, since the medical profession has always extolled trust,
obedience, and compliance as virtues and not vices, any desire on the
part of patients to join in deliberations that can vitally affect patients'
lives runs counter to how their own parents allowed themselves to be
treated and how, in turn, the present generation of patients was social
ized. They learned silent "participation" from the first time they and
their parents visited their pediatricians' offices and they observed their
17. Caplan worries "that physicians ... [may become] blinded by their anger at ...
[Katz's] suggestion that they have somehow consciously plotted against the public to main
tain the norm of silence in an effort to secure wealth, prestige, and autonomy for them
selves." Caplan, supra note 2, at 46-47. While all these considerations playa role, they are
not the major reasons for the silence that pervades physician-patient relations. As I have
emphasized repeatedly, doctors are deeply committed to the idea that patients' medical
interests are best served if they follow doctors' orders. This unexamined conviction guides
physicians' conduct, even though "there is some evidence that demonstrates that compli
ance and obedience are facilitated not by blind trust and obedience to authority, but rather
by informed human beings who recognize each other's fallibility and limits." Id.
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parents' deference. 18 Thus, patients readily feel guilty if they wish to
change practices to which they have been exposed since childhood and
to which their parents had acquiesced. They may ask themselves:
"Are we doing something wrong in asking for something different? Is
it merely oppositional? Is it bad medicine?"
The medical profession must take the initiative and proclaim that
patient participation in decisionmaking is intrinsically good and desir
able. Until physicians so proclaim we cannot know whether "patients
have allowed silence to substitute for conversation as a result of a con
viction ... that healing can be brought about only when the patient
exemplifies the virtues of trust, obedience and compliance" 19 or
whether this conviction is the result of doctors' insistence that patients
surrender themselves to trust, obedience and compliance in order to
enhance the effectiveness of treatment.
The proposition that "[m]edical uncertainty and ignorance have
long been seen as the primary threats to patient hope, and thus to the
efficacy of medical interventions, not just by physicians but by their
patients as well,"20 requires careful scrutiny. I am not sure whether
this perceived threat to patients' hope is not a threat to physicians'
need to appear hopeful. Indeed, uncertainty and even ignorance, if
frankly admitted, do not necessarily have to stifle hope. For admission
of uncertainty and ignorance attests not only to the hazards of predic
tion (and in the absence of prediction, hope remains alive) but also to
our ignorance about vis medicatrix naturae (the healing power of na
ture) (p. 196) and its contribution, often in inexplicable ways, to the
prolongation of life.
18. See Katz, Who's Afraid of Informed Consent? 4 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 315, 316
(1976).
Patients are afraid of informed consent because it seems to contradict their all too
ready propensity for childlike surrender to the authority of experts. Patients' awe
of experts has been deeply ingrained in them from the time of their first
remembered visits to the pediatrician's office where they observed how easily the
doctor could make obedient children out of their powerful parents.
Id.
19. Caplan notes that "[p]atients have allowed silence to substitute for conversation
as a result of a conviction, shared and reinforced by their doctors, that healing can only be
brought about when the patient exemplifies the virtues of trust, obedience and compliance."
Caplan, supra note 2, at 45 (emphasis added). Caplan is correct that I am "less willing to
grant, that it is their [the doctors'] clientele who have been equally eager to have someone
occupy ... [the] social niche ... [of authority-once organized religion's authority de
clined]." Id. We do not know whether patients have been compelled to submit to medical
authority because organized medicine provided them with no alternative but to submit,
unless they wished to turn to healers who did not possess the technical training of M.D. 
physicians.
20. Id.
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Expressions of spurious hope can be self-defeating when they fly
in the face of a deteriorating medical condition, and they can reinforce
silence on part of the patient-born out of disbelief and unwillingness
to call the physician a liar-and, in turn, on the part of the physi
cian-born out of guilt over compounding lies with lies. We do not
even know what expressions of hope patients expect from physicians.
It may not be hope of cure-dying patients may have at least an intui
tive appreciation of the impossibility of cure-but the hope that physi
cians will continue to do their level best to spare patients undue pain
and discomfort; that they will stand by and not abandon patients. 21
If, however, the answer turns out to be that patients themselves
prefer silent trust, obedience, and compliance, that "patients are [in
different] or even [hostile] to full participation in the conversations
that guide medical encounters,"22 then disclosure and consent will
remain an empty ritual, a charade. Far better then to dispense with
disclosure and consent and reassert the authority of physicians to
make decisions for patients. A half-hearted commitment to disclosure
and consent will only make deception worse by giving patients, and
doctors as well, the impression that a decision was made jointly when
indeed it was not. It is a most grievous deception, unseemly in any
interactions between human beings.
This brings me to criticisms of my work that are the result of
issues that I barely considered or inadequately explored. First, I
should have acknowledged more fully than I did my own dis-ease over
carving out an exception to uncompromising respect for patients'
choices on the ground of a serious impairment in the process of think
ing about choices (pp. 156-63).23 It is a narrow exception, for
I would [only] consider disobeying a patient's choice when two con
ditions have been met: One, the consequences of non-intervention
pose grave risks to a patient's immediate physical condition and, two,
the process of thinking about choices is so seriously impaired that
neither physician nor patient seem to know what one or both wish
21. I suggest in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient that:
[P]atients hope that physicians can be trusted to observe carefully, to treat them
with care, to alleviate unnecessary suffering, to discuss with them the implications
of uncertainty's inevitable presence, to give the unpredictable forces of nature a
helping hand, and, above all, to remain honestly present and not abandon patients
when they need them most.
KATZ, supra note 1, at 194. See also KATZ, supra note 1, Chapter VIII "The Abandon
ment of Patients: A Final Argument Against Silence," at 207-29.
22. Caplan, supra note 2, at 45.
23. The entire article by Baron is devoted to a perceptive reanalysis of this exception,
also in the context of my imaginary conversation with Mr. D. See Baron, supra note 2.
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to convey to the other. With respect to the first condition, I would
limit interferences with patients' choices to illnesses for which avail
able diagnostic and therapeutic interventions have a reasonable
chance of preventing death or predictable, serious, and irreversible
physical injuries in instances when death or injury would occur
within a relatively short period of time. (The emphasis on serious
physical consequences seeks to balance the values of respect for self
determination and well-being. The emphasis on the time factor
seeks to acknowledge that it can take time to clarify confusion and
misconceptions. For example, time may not be available when,
without intervention, death or injury are imminent.) The first con
dition, however, is only a necessary one for intervention, it is not
decisive by itself. Interference with patients' choices must also meet
another test: The process of thinking about choices must be seri
ously impaired (pp. 157-58).24

I was tempted to omit this section but ultimately I was unwilling to do
so, even though I knew that the exception would invite criticism and
could easily be construed as giving physicians greater license than I
had intended.
My exception is not a retreat to paternalism but a recognition of
the fact that any good principle that defines human conduct can never
rule absolute. Of course, the danger exists, as is true for any departure
from principle, that if license is taken it will be expanded beyond its
rightful limits. The temptation needs to be resisted by the most careful
review of cases in which the exception has been applied.
On further reflection, criticism of my bow to paternalism
notwithstanding, I still believe that the exception must stand for one
major reason:
[T]he right to self-determination about ultimate choices cannot be
properly exercised without first attending to the processes of self
reflection and reflection with others. This holds true for patients as
well as for physicians. Contrary views have paid insufficient respect
not only to human proclivities for unconscious and irrational deci
sion making but also, and more importantly, to the possibilities of
bringing some of these determinants to greater awareness. Such
views on autonomy and self-determination do not pay respect to
"self-defined" individuals; instead, such views inhibit opportunities
for women and men to become clearer about how they may wish to
define themselves, abandoning them instead to a malignant fate. In
the context of physician-patient decision making, it must be recog
nized that illness-including the fears and hopes it engenders, the
24.

(emphasis added).
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ignorance in which it is embedded, the realistic and unrealistic ex
pectations it mobilizes-can contribute to tilting the balance in pa
tients and physicians further toward irrationality and choices that,
on reflection, both might wish to reconsider. In short, I seek to
justify the duty to reflection on the grounds of human beings' capac
ities to take their unconscious and irrationality more fully into ac
count (p. 124).

In moments of crisis, when little time is available before serious irre
versible harm is likely to occur and when neither physician nor patient
seems to know what one or both wish to convey to the other, I would
overrule patients' choices. The reason is that I have no idea, as in the
case of Mr. D., whether acquiescing to his refusal to talk with me
constitutes respect for his autonomy in the sense in which I define it.
However, despite the need for the exception, I must have been
uneasy when I put it on paper. Otherwise, I would have been less
"impersonal, unemotional and deontological"25 in the way in which I
phrased my imaginary dialogue with Mr. D.26 I might then have been
more forthright about my feelings of impotence in the face of his re
fusal to talk. I might have considered telling him: "Try to see things
my way; [w]ould you be willing to ... [talk to me], [p]lease!"27 These
are good suggestions, but what if the patient had persisted in his re
fusal, what then? Should I not have intervened? I could not have
stood by and let him die.
Thus, I admit to my dis-ease over the exception, yet I cannot
eliminate it. Paternalism cannot be banished completely. It is a pater
nalism, however, not based on notions of mental health or illness,28
but on basic assumptions about the psychological nature of human
25. Baron, supra note 2, at 38.
26. Baron cites in considerable detail my imaginary conversation with Mr. D. Id. at
37-38.
27. Id. at 38.
28. I did not wish to suggest that physicians might now "force such treatment on
patients where mental health demanded it." Id. at 33. In his book, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF
DEATH AND DYING, Norman Cantor states:
Professor Jay Katz, a staunch advocate of informed consent, suggests an interest
ing limitation on a patient's prerogative to decline life-saving medical treatment.
He contends that a competent patient ought to be entitled to reject such treatment
even for a "foolish" or "unwise" reason-so long as the patient articulates some
reason for his decision. If the patient insists on rejecting life-saving treatment
"without any explanation," Professor Katz would be inclined to override the pa
tient's determination.
The motivation behind the Katz position is certainly commendable. It is
aimed at assuring that the patient's decision is a truly informed one. The physi
cian seeks to know what motivates the patient to make a seemingly unreasoned
decision, in order to at least try and confront the patient's objections to treatment.
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beings. These assumptions led me to make distinctions between think
ing about choices and choice itselp9 as well as to allow for the rare
exception of overruling choice when reflection about choice is im
paired. Paradoxical as it may sound, I did so because of the high value
I place on autonomy, an autonomy that is not defined solely by a "no"
or "yes" response. 30
There can be no quarrel with the effort to engage the patient in careful
conversation about his life-rejecting determination. The question is, what follows
if the patient persists in his refusal to explain his decision. My own preference
would be to respect the patient's refusal so long as a conscientious determination
can be made-based on the patient's general demeanor and the other conversa
tions - that the patient is competent. This would be so even in the rare instance
when the patient chooses to cloud his ultimate motivations in silence.
N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 25 (1987) (emphasis added).
Cantor suggests that the decision whether to respect a patient's choice ultimately should
also depend on an evaluation of his or her competence. But see Katz, Can Principles Sur
vive in Situations of Critical Care? in ETHICS AND CRITICAL CARE 4-67 (J. C. Moskop &
L. Kopelman eds. 1985).
[U]nilateral assessments [of competence by psychiatric consultants] that implic
itly, if not explicitly, stress the patient's irrationality and not the physician's can
readily compromise mutual exploration from its very beginning. They tend to
fuel a patient's resentment over not being taken seriously, over having to establish
his credentials as a competent person, however much unintended by the physician
. . . . Required instead is a bilateral conversation between doctor and patient that
explores their expectations of one another, that identifies their misconceptions,
their confusions and, most importantly, that seeks to clarify why they wish differ
ent things from one another. All this must be done in the spirit not of assessing,
evaluating, or judging anything but of better understanding one another.
Id. at 51-52.
29. Self-determination contains ... two intertwined, though separable ideas.
One looks at conduct in relation to the external world, at conduct in relation to
action. I call this external component of self-determination choice. It has also
been spoken of as freedom of action. The other looks at conduct in relation to the
internal world, at conduct in relation to thinking about choices by oneself and
with others prior to action. I call this internal component of self-determination
reflection or thinking about choices. Traditionally, discussions of self-determina
tion have emphasized the external component. I shall argue instead that both the
external and internal components deserve equal and separate consideration.
KATZ, supra note 1, at 110-11.
30. [T]he requirement for conversation creates inevitable conflicts with the right
to privacy-the right to keep one's thoughts and feelings to oneself. Thus, the
imposition of an obligation to converse is disrespectful of the right to have one's
initial choice, including the right not to converse, honored. Refusals to converse,
however, totally obscure both patients' and doctors' understanding of how they
arrived at their decision. This is particularly true when patients either decline a
needed medical intervention or accept it unquestioningly. Respect for psycholog
ical autonomy becomes severely compromised when refusals or acceptances are
heeded without question. Here the principle of privacy must bend to psychologi
cal autonomy. (This may turn out to be a rare Hobson's choice, for I expect that
most patients, if invited by their physicians, will welcome conversation.)
KATZ, supra note I, at 127-28.
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Second, I should have written more on the role of patients' family
members in the decisionmaking process. 31 Particularly when patients
and physicians disagree, family members' assistance in clarifying mat
ters should, of course, be invited. Family members can perform the
important function of explaining to their loved ones what is at stake.
Since they know the patient more intimately, they may perform this
task more easily than the physician. They perhaps can find the words
to make the patient understand. 32
Family members, ministers, priests, rabbis, social workers,
nurses, and friends have important roles to play in the process of re
flecting about choices but they cannot, they must not, be allowed to
veto the patient's decision. 33 The ultimate choice belongs to the pa
tient, not only on the grounds of self-determination and autonomy,
although that alone is sufficient, but also on the ground that patients'
and their families' interests do not necessarily coincide, just as physi
cians' and patients' interests are not necessarily identical. This holds
true whether the families' decision is for or against treatment.
Third, I also did not explore the question whether disclosure and
consent should rule absolute in all doctor-patient interactions. Per
haps, at this early stage in the life of informed consent, imposition of
such an absolute rule is asking far too much. Indeed, for some time I
have wondered whether one unitary informed consent doctrine can
ever serve well all situations encompassed by the practice of medicine.
It may make sense to develop a variety of informed consent doctrines
for various well-defined subgroups of medical practice. Let me briefly
describe four such possible subgroups:
(1) For relatively minor, time-limited disorders for which treat
ments are available that do not expose patients to undue risks, e.g., the
common cold, non-specific headaches, or certain dermatological disor
ders, informed consent, for the time being, could be dispensed with
altogether. 34
31. Arthur Dyck correctly points to this omission and makes many perceptive com
ments about the "network of relations" that can assist patients in achieving "an unimpaired
process of thinking about choices." Dyck, Self-Determination and Moral Responsibility, 9
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 53, 58 (1987).
32. Dyck gives a number of examples that demonstrate the contributions family
members can make to the process of thinking about choices. In two instances these contri
butions led the patients to reconsider decision against treatment. Id. at 58-59.
33. But see id. at 59. Dyck also states, "Moral responsibility may sometimes, how
ever, demand that physicians and family members oppose a choice even though the process
of making the choice does not seem impaired." Id.
34. Note the qualifying phrase "for the time being." Eventually this sub-group
should also be covered by its own rule of informed consent. I only suggest that informed
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(2) For acute disorders, e.g., myocardial infarctions that require
immediate intervention as well as keeping the patient as anxiety-free as
possible, the informed consent process may have to be curtailed. Joint
decisionmaking may have to be limited to a few essential matters
about diagnosis and treatment.
(3) For elective procedures, e.g., hysterectomies, tonsillecto
mies, and cholecystectomies, or procedures for which a variety of
treatment (and no treatment) options are available and there is no rush
to proceed, joint decisionmaking should become an absolute rule, un
less patients opt for delegating decisionmaking to their physicians.
However, 'prior to accepting this responsibility physicians should
make reasonable inquiries in order to determine whether responsibility
is delegated out of fear of offending them, concern about imposing on
their time, or patients' lack of knowledge necessary to ask the ques
tions that need to be asked. Patients must be reassured that doctors
are willing to take the time to talk, and that doctors are prepared to
provide the necessary background information so that patients can ask
appropriate questions. In elective procedures informed consent is a
sine que non. Disclosure and consent will lead to fewer interventions
and contribute to reducing the staggering cost of health care.
(4) For conditions, e.g., cancers, in which prognosis is dire and
fatal outcome a likely prospect, the extent of physicians' disclosure
and obtaining patients' consent may be ascertainable only after physi
cians have probed patients' reactions to knowing fully the implications
of their disease on life expectancy. Physicians should be guided by the
strongest presumption in favor of disclosure and consent, which can be
modified only by clear and carefully documented evidence that pa
tients do not wish to be fully informed.
While in recent decades physicians increasingly have revealed the
diagnosis of malignancy to patients, little has changed with respect to
discussing with patients therapeutic options and prognosis. In light of
the spectacular advances in the treatment of cancer, for example, dis
closure of diagnosis has become inevitable so that physicians can em
ploy the treatment modalities now available to patients. At the same
time, the risks and benefits of these therapies-their impact on quality
of life, their often experimental nature, or the fact that choices can be
made among many alternatives, including the alternative of no treatconsent be dispensed with for the time being, to highlight (1) the greater importance of
developing informed consent doctrines for the other three groups; and (2) the crucial im
portance of physicians acknowledging that no informed consent is sought or being ob
tained, and not giving the appearance that disclosures are made and consent is being
obtained when this is not the case.
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ment-are still all too rarely explored with patients and subjected to
joint decisionmaking.
Thus, non-disclosure has merely shifted from diagnosis to therapy
and prognosis. Whatever the merits of deeply held convictions that
hope must be maintained for patients' benefit and that patients do not
wish to be informed about their dire circumstances, it is equally clear
that physicians have given insufficient attention to the possibility that
many, or at least a significant number of patients, prefer to know what
is in store for them.
Nor do we know whether physicians' acknowledgment of the sad
fact that only a "scant menu of options,"35 are available, i.e., "choices
about slow and rapid death, painful and less painful death, "36 will be
preferred by patients, rather than the withholding of such information.
Patients may know more about their conditions than physicians appre
ciate and resent that they have been silently condemned to end life in
pain and without any control over how to live their lives during their
last months in this world. We do not know how patients feel because
physicians have not tried to consult them. Once departed, patients'
feelings are buried with their corpses.
Moreover, we know all too little about dying patients' capacities
to deny, repress, and engage in magical thinking about their illnesses,
if they wish to defend themselves against a full realization of their
hopeless conditions. Those who are so inclined will resort to these
adaptive and defensive mechanisms without being aided and abetted
by their doctors. If physicians desist from shielding patients from the
truth, it will become possible to distinguish better between patients
who wish to employ their own defensive maneuvers and those who
prefer to prepare for death with greater awareness.

****
Matthew Arnold concluded his poem Dover Beach with these op
timistic-pessimistic words:
Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
35.
36.

Caplan, supra note 2, at 50.
Id.
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Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 37
These are apt sentiments for what I have tried to explore in my inquir
ies on informed consent and physician-patient decisionmaking. In to
day's world, conversations between physicians and patients about
medical choices are still conducted "on a darkling plain ... with con
fused alarms of struggle and flight."
I accept as a correct appreciation of my position the criticism that
chides me for depicting physicians and patients too much as adversa
ries 38 and not as persons united in a common cause. In the current
climate of medical decisionmaking, I indeed view physicians and pa
tients as adversaries. But I also have been misunderstood about my
depiction. I did not wish to imply that doctors, in their physical min
istrations, are not deeply committed to doing their level best for their
patients according to their best professional judgment. In that sense
doctors are patients' friends and not their adversaries.
Yet, it is according to doctors' best judgments that patients are
cared for, and not necessarily according to their patients' best judg
ment. The two mayor may not coincide. Paradoxical as it may
sound, it is precisely because of the tremendous advances in medical
science during the last fifty years that physicians' objectives and those
of patients have diverged more than was true in earlier times. As I
have repeatedly emphasized, choice among a variety of medical op
tions has become an integral part of the practice of modern medicine.
Risks of treatment accompany benefits, and iatrogenic complications
have also become an integral aspect of the practice of modern
medicine. Quality of life problems have multiplied as physicians have
developed techniques for keeping patients alive for longer and longer
periods of time.
With choice such a new development, a silent world of doctor and
patient which precludes patient input into choices that can affect their
physical and psychological well-being in decisive ways makes adversa
ries out of them, because the treatment selected by the physicians may
not comport with the patients' choice of treatment. Thus, doctor and
patient can become engaged "in a struggle and flight," as Matthew
Arnold so vividly depicts in a different context, where parties "igno
rant" of their respective wishes can only "clash by night."
The poet, in part, despaired: "The world ... so beautiful ... hath
37. Arnold, "Dover Beach," in THE POETICAL WORKS OF MATTHEW ARNOLD 210
(c. B. Tinker & H. F. Lowry eds. 1957).
38. Duffy, supra note 7, at 24-25.
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really neither joy, nor love ... nor certitude, nor help for pain ...."
Yet, he began on an optimistic note, "[alh, love let us be true to one
another ...." In these stanzas, he may have wished to hold out the
hope that if two persons can learn to be true to one another, the world
may yet become filled with joy and help for pain.
In reflecting on this poem, I was reminded of the two corner
stones of Greek medicine: philanthropia (love of man) and
philotechnia (love of the art [of healing]).39 Such love requires trust.
Yet, can trust flourish unless doctor and patient are true to one an
other? Should it not be a trust based on truth and mutual assent
rather than on obedience and compliance-the kind of trust that un
derlies the idea of informed consent? Cannot such a trust be realized
only if physicians cease to control their patients and, instead, learn to
trust their patients as doctors wish to be trusted by their patients? Is
not the true meaning of trust the capacity to trust oneself and the
other?
If the idea of informed consent were to govern physician-patient
relations, physicians' moral authority would be based not only upon
their expert knowledge to diagnose and treat but also upon an aware
ness of the tragic limitations of their expert knowledge. 4O They would
then be forced to reflect more deeply on their moral responsibility to
share with or withhold from patients both their knowledge and igno
rance. Patients' moral authority would rest on their right to care for
their bodies in their own ways, including delegation of that authority
to their doctors.
Fidelity to the idea of informed consent eschews physicians' uni
lateral exercise of moral authority and shifts the focus to new ques
tions: must not physicians, in light of their knowledge and ignorance,
impress on patients that medical decisions are best made jointly?
Must not patients learn that the moral authority to make choices be
longs to them and not to their physicians?
The contributors to this volume have wrestled hard with the
problems of trust and mutuality between doctors and patients. If the
39. P. ENTRALGO, DOCTOR AND PATIENT 45-51 (F. Partridge trans. 1969).
40. As I state in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient:
[T]o trust patients, physicians first must learn to trust themselves to face up to
and acknowledge the tragic limitations of their own professional knowledge; their
inability to impart all their insights to all patients; and their own personal inca
pacities - at times more pronounced than at others - to devote themselves fully
to their patients' needs. They must also learn not to be unduly embarrassed by
their personal and professional ignorance and to trust their patients to react ap
propriately to such acknowledgments.
KATZ, supra note 1, at 102-03.
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authors' insights and recommendations41 will be subjected to further,
relentless scrutiny, we may yet see the dawn of a new age in which
physicians and patients will not encounter each other on "a darkling
plain."

41. I cannot conclude without apologizing for not commenting on all the articles
that are part of this symposium. I of course was gratified that Professor Annas, Professor
Johnson, Professor Miller, Jl'.dge Dunphy and Mr. Cross, and Professor Rhoden found my
book useful in pursuit of their specific research interests; that Chief Justice Doolin incorpo
rated my views in Scott v. Bradford; and that Professor Minow extended my observations to
broader areas of human interaction. I can only acknowledge that I learned much from
them, but to do justice to their contributions would have required writing another book.

